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Sharing adds a paradox to the question of transfer and value: Why do people share what 
they value even though they cannot count on a return? This contribution breaks with the 
conventional assumption that practices of sharing are simple prestages of more complex 
reciprocal gift-exchange or commodity transactions. Instead I consider sharing to be a 
complex social phenomenon that makes rather specific requirements in regard to bodily 
copresence, relatedness, and interaction. Based on ethnographic field research I also 
suggest that forms of “demand sharing” should not be considered to be aberrations since 
they conform particularly well to the values enshrined in sharing. 
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Why do people share what they value—even though they cannot count on a 
return? 
When ethnographic accounts of sharing enter wider social science discussions, 
a twofold strategy for solving this apparent paradox emerges. Both strands of this 
strategy attempt to escape the paradox by incorporating the phenomenon of 
sharing into the dominant theory of value derived from monetized markets and 
reciprocal exchanges. Sharing is either redefined as a covert form of market 
behavior or as ultimately governed by extended forms of reciprocity. 
The first part of the strategy suggests that it is rational for a hunter of a large 
animal to let others take a share. It assumes that limits of storing large amounts of 
meat (and of consuming it all by oneself) convince the hunter that he might as well 
give the meat away. This is put into direct parallel with what lions do when they 
allow others to eat the carrion once he (or she) is finished (see Ridley 1997: 111). 
In other words, this way of sharing no longer poses a problem to the market-
derived theory of value because what is shared is basically of little value for the 
giver at that particular point, plus we are given an evolutionary argument on how 
sharing evolved, since humans are said to have copied it from lions. Now, there is 
in fact some evidence that humans did scare off lions in order to get to the carcass 
of large animals, but apparently before the lion had enough of its kill and before its 
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value was approaching nil—so that in a way we could say that the hunters were 
teaching the lion a lesson of human values rather than the other way round. Either 
way, the more relevant counterevidence in this context is that the bulk of reported 
sharing does not involve extraordinary quantities of meat but instead the ordinary 
shared consumption of gathered food and other everyday items. Moreover, 
foragers occasionally do store food and they still value and eat meat and other food 
after others consider it to be well beyond its shelf life. All of these ethnographic 
observations seriously weaken the proposed explanation that things get shared 
because they are basically no longer of value to whoever possesses them but are 
considered surplus that would be wasted unless given away. By contrast, people 
apparently do share what they value and what is of value. 
The complementary strategy to explain sharing practices on the background of 
current commercial exchange is to show that sharing is really nothing but a 
conversion of one currency into another (Ridley 1997), one that even produces 
“interest” and “profits” in the form of prestige, insurance (reduced risk, obligation 
by others in tough times), favors with the local women and other things that suggest 
that the hunter aims for a “a good deal” just as “any broker on the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange” (Ridley 1997: 116). Again, ethnography suggests that “not-
in-kind exchange” occurs but that it does not account for all situations of sharing 
(cf. Marlowe 2004: 74). In fact, the perspective of the successful male hunter 
converting meat into services is not the most typical of all sharing contexts. As I 
point out in more detail below there are practices that systematically downplay the 
role of the provider in sharing. Even more damaging to this theory of sharing as 
converted value is the fact that typically, and prototypically, there are cases that 
cannot be stretched to fit the logic of exchange, be it geared toward reciprocity or 
profit. When a child receives from its parents or when the hunters see an animal as 
offering itself (Duerr 2010: 85–88) or as the environment “giving” it to them (Bird-
David 1990), we have to go as far as to assume a notion of “cosmic” returns that 
delay reciprocity many generations down the line (or down the species ladder for 
that matter) for it to still be called reciprocal exchange. Otherwise the notion of 
reciprocity loses mutuality as its defining property, since—as Alfred Gell (1999: 88) 
has pointed out—a balance of comparable mutual sacrifices is built into the notion 
of reciprocity. 
The challenge of sharing, therefore, continues to be that people do share what 
they value, they share without receiving or even expecting returns, and they even—
at times—value sharing itself. More specifically, they primarily value the sharing 
action by others while they themselves may avoid sharing by hiding things or at 
least by trying not to share at all times and under all circumstances. Therefore, it is 
important to distinguish the motivation to give from the occurrence of transferred 
food (or other items) since the two do not necessarily match (Marlowe 2004: 73). 
There is sharing without the motive to give—and, conversely, the motive to give 
exists without it being sharing, most prominently in gift-giving. This makes a 
simplistic explanation of why people share even less convincing when conceived of 
as reciprocal exchange and it makes sharing an even greater challenge to an 
emerging anthropological theory of value. In this contribution I want to show why 
social science approaches have tried so hard to treat sharing as a form of reci-
procity (and thereby tried to render it unproblematic for a universalizing theory of 
value), why this attempt has failed, and what an ethnographically informed account 
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of sharing contributes to an emerging theory of value that goes beyond 
assumptions based on market exchange, barter, and gift-exchange. 
Since we are most accustomed to settings in which forms of competitive market 
exchange, reciprocal gift-exchange, and sharing coexist, it is tempting to explain all 
of these transactions in terms of the most dominant form(s) of transaction. This is 
what Graeber’s critique of economic theories of money (and of value) tries to 
show: in academic and popularized economics the rules of market exchange are 
projected onto other forms of transfer (see Graeber 2001, 2011). The initial 
relativist anthropological response has been to show that each form of transfer is 
governed by its own morality and its own set of values not reducible to the others. 
Notions of reciprocity and gift-giving have been the champions in the attempt to 
provide a (mirror) image of forms of transfer and value generation that are to be 
distinguished from commodity exchange. However, people do not live in enclosed 
worlds consisting of a single mode of transfer and an associated single regime of 
values. And in those situations in which one mode is more dominant than others, 
it need not be that of exchange (of either commodities or gifts). For even in the 
heart of Melanesia, with its elaborate gift exchange systems, there are situations 
such as those of the Umeda where exchange plays no significant part and where 
instead forms of sharing or service provisioning (see Gell 1999: 85) form the base 
of sociality. Therefore, the development of a more general theory of value that 
would account for the various forms of transfer and the moralities associated with 
them is still on the agenda—a theory that will necessarily have to connect the 
establishment of value with established values in social practice (see Otto and 
Willerslev in part one of this special issue and Lambek in part two of this special 
issue). Bringing in action and agency is key in this attempt because up to now the 
comparative study of values has been seriously inhibited due to the failure “to 
relate it properly to action” (Graeber 2001:4). As one further step toward such a 
goal, the remainder of this contribution highlights the actions that constitute and 
enable sharing and that can add to an emerging theory of value by taking the 
insights on sharing into account. 
 
Why sharing is not reciprocity—but why many want i t  to be 
The language of market exchange is so pervasive today that it is not only the major 
source for concepts of value but also the backdrop against which those cases are 
discussed that do not easily fit the marketplace perspective. The laws of rational 
choice theory that are derived from market exchange and taught in introductory 
“Economics 101” courses continue to be criticized by anthropologists for not doing 
justice to the activities that are found in the broader human spectrum of “econ-
omic” pursuits (see Graeber 2011: 90). Consequently, “Anthropology 101” courses 
have highlighted an alternative set of laws around reciprocity and gift exchange (see 
Eriksen 2010). It appears that the more widespread the market rhetoric of self-
interested calculation became, the more insistently anthropologists emphasized the 
morality of fair reciprocal exchange in the ethnographic record and in their policy 
recommendations for the current global situation (think of “fair trade”). While the 
two tropes of marketization and reciprocity seem to be mutually reinforcing, it is 
important to point out that there is more to the anthropology of value than 
reciprocal exchange alone. A considerable part of this “more” is discussed under 
the notion of “sharing.” 
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Over the last two decades considerable effort has been spent to establish that 
sharing is not adequately covered under a notion of reciprocity but that it is a form 
of transfer sui generis and “an important transactional mode in its own right” (Gell 
1999: 77). While this discussion was first carried out above all in the specialized 
field of hunter-gatherer studies (Woodburn 1998; Hunt 2000; cf. Wenzel et al. 
2000) it has also involved other societies (see Gell 1999) and it is currently being 
picked up in more general accounts (Graeber 2011; Ferguson 2011; cf. Widlok 
and Tadesse 2005). Sharing as a practice continues to be prevalent also among 
former hunter-gatherers who pursue other subsistence modes in what Alan 
Barnard has labeled the “foraging mode of thought” (Barnard 2004). Sharing is 
therefore not limited to a specific mode of subsistence. Rather, it is connected to 
particular forms of conceptualizing property and of organizing social life that we 
find in some hunter-gatherer societies (or former hunter-gatherer societies) but also 
more widely as aspects of other societies, typically those with brideservice (rather 
than bridewealth) and more generally with a “service economy” (Gell 1999: 88) 
rather than a gift economy or commodity economy. In a more recent twist of the 
debate, Alberto Corsín Jiménez and Rane Willerslev (2007) have argued that a 
focus on the “visible economy” (of what is observably transferred among human 
agents) may provide a wrong image of sharing (and selling, exchange, theft, 
etcetera) as completely separate types that could be correlated with types of 
societies.1 They argue, on the basis of Siberian ethnography, that not only do 
various forms of transfer coexist but moreover that in the conceptualization of the 
agents themselves notions such as sharing can get stretched to their limits so that 
they touch upon apparent opposites such as theft or reciprocal exchange. In some 
cases, we are here dealing with the influential dominant logic of commercial 
indebtedness modifying other forms of transfer to the extent that they then appear 
to be inversions of commercial exchange, or its constitutive necessary opposite. In 
other cases what is labeled sharing may be framed and transformed by a form of 
distribution or of gift-giving, which then changes the values of the apparent 
                                                
1. The main argument of Corsín Jiménez and Willerslev (2007; see also Strathern 2011) 
is a critique of established anthropological notions of what constitutes “a concept.” 
There is no room here to engage with their epistemological argument. Suffice to say 
that I think there is plenty of evidence that concepts are constantly shifting not least 
because they rely on language in dialogue that recontextualizes them all the time (see 
Wierzbicka 2010 who provides evidence for some key scientific concepts such as 
“experience,” “evidence,” “sense,” or “empirical”). Our concepts on transfers are no 
exception in this. What is worthwhile adding is that not only do concepts get stretched 
and occasionally collapse into their opposite even within a cultural tradition (e.g., when 
talking of “negative growth” etcetera) but in practice, too, they shade into one another 
(when “buying” a bankrupt company or desolate building for a “symbolical” single 
dollar). This in itself does not imply that we may only accept fuzzy concepts to describe 
fuzzy phenomena. There can be a value in analytically separating what forms a continu-
um, especially in contrast to local concepts that bundle up actions and motives in a 
culturally specific way. Ultimately, I see researchers and the agents involved in the trans-
fers discussed here as following the same process. When construing concepts and when 
dealing with forms of transfer we are moving laterally from case to case, situation to 
situation, sharpening our expectations for the future as we go on. And in both cases this 
is not a journey undertaken on our own but necessarily in communication with others 
and with the communicative settings that influence the outcome of this process. 
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“sharing”—just like a minus can change the values of relations when preceding a 
bracket. This is, for instance, the case when what is sometimes called “sharing” is 
in fact overseen and controlled by wealthy sponsors (or in other contexts influential 
elders) in a way that effectively redefines it into forced pooling with subsequent 
redistribution (see Corsín Jiménez and Willerslev 2007: 533). Similarly, in other 
settings (also within Melanesia) gift-giving may exist prior to reciprocal exchange 
and in a dynamic tension with it (Rio 2007). In other words, not only are we 
dealing with complex articulations of modes of transfer but also there is always the 
potential for negation and for a reversible movement. It is therefore important not 
only to explain the origins of sharing (or any other mode of transfer) but also its 
transformation and its demise. I recognize these complications but I maintain that 
not all practices are equally coimplicated with one another all the time, which 
makes inversion and the limits of negotiation empirical questions. I think that there 
are patterns that emerge and it is one of my main concerns to investigate the social 
actions that are being employed in particular settings to move either into a trans-
actional mode such as sharing or out of it. After all, what distinguishes the various 
forms of transactions are not their specific formal character but the situation or 
social context that allows them to emerge—and that allows us to recognize their 
specific characteristics in the first place (see Gell 1999: 80). Identifying which 
aspects of social interaction and of morality go together with certain forms of 
transfer (and in which situations) remains an important anthropological task to 
which I want to turn now. 
The tendency to consider all nonmarket exchanges as manifestations of 
“reciprocity” was formalized and popularized in Marshall Sahlins’s model of 
modes of exchange (cf. Sahlins 1988). As I have already pointed out (and others 
before me, see Gell 1999; Hunt 2000) it is misleading to cover all these trans-
actions under the notion of “reciprocity.” However, the main reason why this 
model continues to be popular, especially outside economic anthropology, is that it 
proposes a forceful correlation between modes of economic transaction (“nega-
tive,” “balanced,” and “generalized” reciprocity) and modes of social organization 
(house, lineage, village, tribal, intertribal). Sahlins’s well known diagram (Sahlins 
1988: 199) even suggested that the modes of transaction could be mapped onto the 
living arrangements of transfer partners in a single two-dimensional graph of 
concentric circles with house and generalized reciprocity at its center, negative 
reciprocity at the outside and balanced reciprocity in between. As with all simple 
models, this represents some features of reality better than others. The model 
rings true only insofar as it suggests that very close and very distant relationships are 
not necessarily those of balanced reciprocal transfers, in actual fact, but also in 
terms of the moral expectations involved. The happiness of the commodity trader 
distant from his customer is to have received a more valued item for a less valued 
one (Gell 1999: 85). Similarly, the pride of those in close “popular” neighborhood 
environments is that they do not need (nor expect) a “thank you” for acknow-
ledging the value of the service they provide (Graeber 2011: 123-4). The model 
has been very productive in the discussions that it has provoked over time but 
almost from the start two fundamental critiques have been raised against it. First, it 
is overstretching of the notion of reciprocity to cover transactions that are clearly 
not reciprocal at all (“generalized reciprocity” for sharing and “negative reciprocity” 
for stealing). As Hunt (2000) has suggested, the more neutral term transfer is much 
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better suited as a cover term since it avoids this conceptual fusion. Second, 
empirically the claim that generalized reciprocity always implies close kinship 
relations did not stand up to the fact that sharing has been observed to be at times 
indiscriminate in regard to specific kin relations, since it may include everyone 
present, even “distant” visitors or anthropologists who are not treated as close kin 
in other contexts. Both, the conceptual and the empirical critique have led James 
Woodburn (1998) to underline that “sharing is not a form of reciprocity.” 
According to Woodburn, sharing is characterized precisely by contexts in which 
transfer is not based on specific kin obligations and in which it is not creating 
specific long-term commitments. However, merely distinguishing sharing from 
reciprocity in terms of one-way versus two-way transfers is also not sufficient. 
Elsewhere, I have pointed out difficulties of this distinction because it easily breaks 
down if we shift the relevant timeframe and if we take into account the multiplicity 
of perspectives (Widlok 2004). What agents (or observers for that matter) expect 
to be a two-way exchange may turn out to be a one-way transfer (and vice versa). 
What is considered a transfer from one perspective may be considered an 
exchange from the perspective of another participant (“paying tribute” is a case in 
point, see Widlok 1999a: 30–32).2 Moreover, there are constant attempts to make 
one form of transfer appear to look like a different one, to stretch a concept to its 
acceptable limits, as Corsín Jiménez and Willerslev (2007) have pointed out. Pace 
Corsín Jiménez and Willerslev I do not think that our analysis should necessarily 
emulate this practice but rather to provide sharp and useful conceptual tools for 
describing and distinguishing these practices. 
So, what are the defining characteristics of sharing settings beyond the fact that 
it is labeled sharing (or an equivalent term) in a particular local context and beyond 
essentialist features such as it being one-way or generalized? Elsewhere (Widlok 
2004) I have suggested that what characterizes a sharing context comparatively is 
that it extends the circle of people who can enjoy the good implicated in a 
resource, for instance accessing a certain resource such as water. In other words, 
sharing food or drink is an action done for its own sake, putting the good of 
nourishment in the place of any specific goals that may be derivative of the transfer 
of food items, for instance the attempt to create obligations for the future. In this 
understanding, sharing is not a manifestation of an altruistic move, putting the goals 
of others above one's own goals, but rather one of renouncing derivative goals 
altogether in the face of intrinsic goods—its intrinsic value if you will. In gift-giving 
contexts, by contrast, goals of various kinds (whether held jointly by the exchange 
partners or not, whether altruistic or egoistic) override the intrinsic good of 
whatever it is that is being provided. I concede that this invites more questions 
about what actions allow such a sharing context to arise in the first place, a point 
that I shall address below. In a nutshell, what I suggest is that sharing among 
humans is best understood as the result of complex forms of interactions. Insofar 
as human agency is by definition one that allows itself to be directed toward certain 
goals, and moreover toward a choice of goals, the creation of situations for the 
                                                
2. Valerio Valeri (1994) has made a similar point in regard to the Huaulu where the 
transfer of women is considered buying by the wife-takers but not selling by the wife-
givers. It depends on the various actions involved in the process as to whether a transfer 
tends toward a gift/prestation or toward a purchase (see Valeri 1994: 5). 
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renunciation of goals is in fact a complex cultural achievement, one may even say 
one of the earliest cultural inventions of humankind—and it is certainly not to be 
confused with exchange or with reciprocity, which, of course, rely on their own 
social and cultural preconditions. 
The anthropological debate that surrounds the social evolution of transaction 
modes is still largely unresolved. Contrary to a prevailing popular image there 
seems to be dwindling support for the primacy of reciprocity in the evolution of 
transaction modes. Knut Rio (2007) suggests that giving may precede exchange 
while Gell suggests that in many Melanesian settings, commodity exchange is 
“primordial” (1999: 97) since it provides the necessary input for gift-exchange, 
which in turn “mimic[s] the processes of commodity exchange” (1999: 77) and that 
sharing preceded gift-exchange (1999: 85) as a baseline. In fact, this is also reflected 
in Sahlins’s model, which places sharing at the zero-point—literally—in his above-
mentioned graph that summarizes “the sociology of primitive exchange” (Sahlins 
1988: 199), but figuratively this is also true for many other contributions in this 
debate. The practices that we now cover under the technical term of sharing as a 
specific mode of transfer were originally discussed under the notion of “primitive 
communism” (for a summary see Barnard 1983; Lee 1988) and presumed to be 
the earliest phase of human development. Sharing practices were either considered 
to be basic either in chronological terms or in logical terms as the essence of a 
“baseline communism” that continues to be “the foundation of all human socia-
bility” including present-day market society (Graeber 2011: 96–98). Either way, 
sharing is considered to be the baseline, the default, the natural state of affairs. 
While there is some truth in this in terms of social evolution, the portrayal of 
sharing as a baseline is problematic insofar as it begs the question of how sharing 
came into being and what its constituent actions are then and today, especially 
since sharing continues in many settings and it gets reinvented under certain 
conditions. Moreover, it leads us away from investigating sharing in its own right by 
concentrating on the cultural inventions that apparently followed later on in the 
emancipation or destruction of this early stage of sharing, which makes it harder to 
see moves into and out of this mode of transaction. Incidentally, the evaluation of 
this move away from sharing is secondary here. Whether thinkers regretted the 
departure from the original state of affairs (as Rousseau did) or whether they saw it 
as a necessary first step toward a more industrious and complex human society (as 
Marx and Engels did), their work does not really help us to understand how 
sharing emerges and is maintained. In order to advance this line of thought we 
need a better understanding of sharing as a complex phenomenon. As a complex 
phenomenon in itself, sharing builds on other practices that are combined and 
brought to bear in a particular social environment. In what follows I sketch one 
particular ethnic environment in which sharing thrives in the present. I concede 
that sharing is multifaceted and that it may build on more or other practices than 
those that I describe. My main point here is that—even if sharing is logically and 
chronologically prior to other forms of economic relations—the practice of sharing 
itself builds on more basic modules of (inter)action. This may also help us to 
understand why in many contexts sharing has given way to other forms of transfer 
since this development can be described in terms of changes to the social environ-
ment that undermine the cultural forms of interactions on which sharing relies. 
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Why sharing is best conceived of as a complex phenomenon 
Numerous ethnographies provide the factual background for my claim that sharing 
is best understood to be a complex phenomenon. Lorna Marshall (1976, 1998), 
for instance, has documented the various waves of sharing that take place among 
the !Kung. In the case of hunted meat, the sharing begins early on with mutual 
swapping or “borrowing” of arrows for the hunt, which makes the arrow makers 
participate in the hunts (and hunting success) of fellow hunters who carry and use 
arrows of several coresident men. It furthermore involves primary sharing at the 
killing site, secondary sharing upon returning from the site of the kill to the camp, 
and tertiary sharing after food has been prepared. Another dimension of 
complexity of sharing has been highlighted by Richard Lee (1979, 2003) in regard 
to the gossip that surrounds sharing, again long before there is anything to share, 
then while the sharing is taking place and long after the event. Sharing is demanded 
and commented upon, people claim that it does not take place frequently enough 
and when it takes place the provider or the share is ridiculed in a way that is 
generally explained in terms of a leveling device to underwrite equality. Hence the 
acts of sharing and the comments about sharing are far from being in unison and 
language adds a separate dimension of complexity to the sharing phenomenon, it is 
not merely a mirror of action (see Aikhenvald in part two of this special issue). 
Acts and the way they are presented and commented upon not only differ, they 
may also be purposefully in contrast with one another because comments on 
sharing are at the same time also themselves acts that may be intended to prompt 
acts of sharing or to prevent their political exploitation. Thus, there is a horizontal 
complexity in terms of a time scale of primary and secondary sharing and so on. 
Then there is also a vertical complexity depending on the degree of meta-
comments that are involved. Moreover, we may add a third axis to this complexity, 
namely a lateral complexity in that previous experiences and actions constitute 
certain reliable expectations while still leaving a considerable amount of uncertainty 
as to whether and how sharing takes place. Independent of the horizontal timeline 
and the vertical gradient between explicitness and implicitness, sharing is complex 
because its outcome is in many ways open while being influenced through past 
experiences. As the following examples from my field research with ≠Akhoe 
Hai//om in northern Namibia testify (for details see Widlok 1999a) the complexity 
of sharing is to a large extent due to the fact that the taker rather than the provider 
typically initiates it.3 
 
                                                
3. Remarks by one of the anonymous reviewers suggest that in the context of sharing we 
may be well advised not to use the same terms (giver, receiver, exchange) that are used 
in the analysis of gift-exchange so as to avoid confusion. I have tried to use an alter-
native set of terms (provider, taker, swapping) but I also underwrite other comments 
made by a reviewer, namely that a distinctive conceptual terminology should not suggest 
that there are no conversions and inversions of these practices and that they often 
condition one another as imagined or real opposites. I want to take the opportunity to 
thank all three anonymous reviewers and Ton Otto and Rane Willerslev as editors of 
this special issue for their comments and for including this contribution on sharing, 
which in many ways goes against the grain of many ideas developed in the debates 
about gift-exchange. 
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Case 1 
Lukab is visiting from another place. He just takes the cup of coffee that Teseb (his 
son-in-law) has put in front of him without asking. There are no objections. Then 
Kurukhoes comes and takes away Lukab’s hat, who in turn takes Teseb’s hat. 
Again no objections are raised. (The hat is returned a day later.) Just a day earlier 
I/naib (a relative of Teseb with the same surname) tried to do the same, trying to 
pinch a sip of coffee from Teseb's cup. He was told to stop it and they tried to 
make him set down the cup but only managed after he had taken his sip. 
 
Case 2 
!Gamekhas is cooking maize meal, which was received from relatives who work on 
a farm. When the food is being prepared, a number of neighbors come and talk 
about the farm and the visit. Then, when the food is ready, a number of plates are 
filled and the people living at this hearth start to eat. //Ahes, who is visiting with 
some other women and children, starts making remarks that indicate how hungry 
she is and that she will just go home to her fire and “stay like that.” She repeats this 
in a number of ways. Eventually she goes away. A little later Khau/nais comes and 
loudly demands, “Give me food!” She is not prevented from taking some from the 
plate. 
 
Case 3 
Madab has sent three onions to Davib. When the onions are handed over to 
Davib, I/naib, who is also present, grabs one and starts to walk off to his fireplace. 
Davib complains and says I/naib should return the onion but I/naib insists that he 
needs it to prepare sauce to go with his food. He walks off and Davib gives up. 
 
These three events from my notes indicate that sharing is not an automatism 
but it is the product of complex interaction. I tried to establish in each of these 
situations what the decisive factors were that led to a successful transfer in one 
instance (Case 3), partially successful in another (Case 1), or that prevented such a 
transfer in yet another instance (Case 2). When looking over the cases it emerges 
that instead of a hard and fast list of factors from which we could predict the 
occurrence of sharing, the cases only provide some necessary cultural conditions 
under which sharing takes place. There was not one decisive factor (or several 
factors) sufficient to predict sharing. A still common stereotype about Paleolithic 
hunter-gatherers (see Schurz 2008: 30) holds that foragers needed to be able to 
predict where a particular food source was to be found but that it was only after the 
causes of plant growth were well known to them that they could “advance” beyond 
foraging toward agriculture. Inverting this stereotype we could argue that it is more 
accurate that to predict where a share is to be found is not possible but that the 
situative “causes” that can lead to sharing are indeed well known to participants—
and correspondingly are also frequently reported in the ethnography. These 
cultural conditions, a set of actions and situations that are conducive to sharing may 
be summarized under three headings: the modes of relatedness, the modes of 
conversation, and the modes of bodily presence involved. 
 
Relatedness: The kin relationship between people present plays a role in sharing 
events. It is not the case that certain kinship terms inevitably involve a particular 
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form of transfer (or vice versa) but rather that both are relevant for the establish-
ment of what the status of mutual involvement for the persons concerned is. In this 
process the categorization of a particular person with a particular kinship term 
often follows the interaction rather than the other way around. The attribution of 
kin terms is universalist in these societies, that is, it extends to all humans. 
However, since there are always multiple ways of calculating kin relations in such 
small-scale societies, the participants may try to draw the other person near or keep 
a distance by using specific kin terms (see Widlok 1999a). And they do so on the 
basis of their experience with fellow humans, above all with regard to sharing. 
Being in a particular kinship relationship is no guarantee for sharing to take place 
and conversely sharing is not restricted to certain categories of kin. However, the 
two do not occur independently; the occurrence of sharing and the categorization 
of kin are mutually informative. Agents do not deduct behavior from kin terms, 
nor do they construct kin terms solely on the basis of sharing behavior. Rather, 
both kinship links and the occurrence of past sharing provide the necessary ground 
for sharing to take place and they provide background knowledge for agents to 
know whether sharing is likely to take place or not. 
 
Conversat ion:  At the time when I collected the instances of sharing reported on 
above, I did not have an audio or video recorder in place. But even without such a 
record it became clear that the mode of the conversation played a key role in these 
events. Direct demands occurred but also continual muttering at the side. There is 
a lot of parallel talking in ≠Akhoe Hai//om speech events, which implies that 
diverse and even contrastive statements can be made and juxtaposed without there 
being a linear argument of talk and countertalk. Many utterances do not get a 
response, many questions do not get answered, many statements are apparently 
ignored as if they had not been heard. Conversely, even harsh statements can be 
made without necessarily provoking a direct harsh response. Conversation is as 
varied as the use of kin terms but it sets the scene for sharing to take place. Sharing 
may therefore be provoked by indirect or direct demands (“Give me!” “Au te re”). 
In other words, sharing is not prevented through the use of direct demands (as in 
some Western notions of nonsolicited “free” giving). Additionally, there are 
numerous indirect ways to initiate sharing, namely by expressing a need, one’s 
nonhaving. ≠Akhoe Hai//om may say: “I have no water!” or, “There is a lack of 
water.” “Are we without water?” “Imagine that there was something to drink . . .” 
(see Widlok 1997). Again, there is no single utterance that guarantees sharing but 
the conversational strategies provide the background against which providers and 
takers find sharing to be an acceptable strategy or even a mode of transfer that they 
cannot avoid without risking confrontation or open conflict. 
 
Presence:  Strictly speaking, we may consider the modes of kin talk to be a sub-
category of modes of conversation, which in turn may be considered a subcategory 
of bodily presence. The mode of personal presence is therefore a critical factor, a 
prompt for sharing. Frequently, third parties, for instance children, act as inter-
mediaries, which works well when they are sent with food to deliver to others but 
less well when they are sent to demand food. This means that sharing can take 
place without giving in the sense of directly handing over. However, by not being 
on the scene yourself your chances of receiving a share decrease dramatically. Con-
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versely, to be physically present in itself establishes a potential claim and to provide 
a share is an acknowledgement of the presence of the other as a person. However, 
presence needs to be recognized by those who are, for example, sitting at a hearth 
preparing or having food. Visitors to a hearth may only be greeted and addressed a 
fairly long time after they have sat down quietly somewhere, or in extreme cases 
they may not be spoken to at all (see Widlok 1999b). Thus, physical presence is 
regulated not only by those who move to a place but also by those who are already 
present. Copresence is an intercorporeal act in the true sense of the word in that it 
depends on the bodily movements of everyone on the scene. It matters how (and 
how long) someone decides to get closer and it matters how (and how long) those 
at the receiving end decide to acknowledge the presence of the other person. In all 
three modes of (inter)action that I have just described sharing requires particular 
actions by both provider and taker, accepting certain kin relations, responding to 
speech acts, and recognizing physical presence. 
 
The dynamics of sharing 
As mentioned above, part of the complexity of sharing is the fact that it tends to be 
initiated by the receiver (the taker) and that it does not depend on a charitable 
attitude of the giver (who is more of a provider) nor does it exclude sentiments of 
possessiveness among providers who may want to hide what they have so that they 
do not need to share. I do not, therefore, consider demand sharing to be a 
separate or even an unusual type of sharing but rather its prototype. The notion of 
demand sharing had a critical importance when it was first formulated (Peterson 
1993). Among other things, it was used to cleanse the concept of sharing from the 
Western bias of charity. Many acts of sharing took place, and continue to take 
place, because they are initiated by the taker and social strategies are in place that 
decouple giving from receiving. Sharing may therefore take place without the 
provider enacting and expressing charity. Often it takes place in a way that down-
grades the act of giving (see for instance Lee 2003) as part of leveling any potential 
attempts of the giver to take political advantage from his or her economically 
advantaged position. Demand sharing not only inverts the sequence of action but 
also the tone of the transaction that is known as “charitable giving.” It would 
therefore be wrong to consider demand sharing as a different type of transfer than 
sharing since in a certain sense there is no sharing without a demand. The demand 
need not be uttered, and it need not be the demand of a specific interlocutor since 
it is a demand for provisioning that emerges as a consequence of moral role 
relationships (Gell 1999: 87) or as incurred by a particular situation of copresence, 
as I would prefer to call it. We need to recognize that one’s mere bodily presence, 
underlined by addressing the other person in particular ways, is always a demand 
for being acknowledged as a partner, a personal being with legitimate needs. An 
appropriate definition of demand sharing is therefore much broader than the use 
of explicit demands such as “Give me . . .” leading to the appropriation of what 
one may think one is entitled to. The explicitness of the demand may differ and it 
may be entirely implicit very much like a “silent demand” (cf. Løgstrup 1997). 
Humans are sufficiently able to put themselves into the situation of others to be 
able to know what the intrinsic goods of shared objects are for fellow humans 
without any demand being uttered. 
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The underlying (implicit or explicit) demands that trigger sharing rely on 
cultural practices that are recognized as appropriate actions that make a difference, 
and are recognized by providers and takers but also by the bystanders for whom 
each act of sharing adds to the shared system of value. I have labeled the cultural 
practices on which sharing is based the modes of relatedness, the modes of talking, 
and the modes of corporeal presence as outlined above. The shared common 
ground that is necessary for sharing to be instituted as a habitual practice is 
therefore considerable. Only where this common ground exists can a transfer 
regularly take the shape of sharing. This underpins my general contention that 
sharing is an important cultural innovation and not an empty default or neutral 
baseline. It is as much culturally instituted as other forms of transfer, be it gift-
exchange, trading, bartering, or commercial transactions. 
Consequently, I also suggest that the move away from sharing is not that of a 
void that gets filled with cultural activities but rather as a consequence of the shared 
common ground that crumbles away or changes. We have enough ethnography to 
show that sharing breaks down when the shared common ground disappears, in 
terms of modes of relatedness, of talk, and of corporeal presence. The exact point 
when the critical threshold for breakdown has been reached is difficult to establish 
since it is the changing combination of factors that appears to be critical. When 
social agents reduce the multiplicity of potential kinship links to a fixed set of 
membership roles in social groups, when they abandon certain ways of 
conversation (for instance, that of talking parallel to one another) in favor of 
disciplined rhetoric, and when they start living in secluded homes and hearth 
places that make copresence less likely and more cumbersome to achieve (see 
Widlok 1999b), then the institutionalized practice of sharing loses the basis of 
shared practices upon which it is built. If this general pattern is valid we can easily 
imagine historical and evolutionary scenarios whereby the diminishment of sharing 
is neither a purposeful abandonment nor one that becomes inevitable and 
irreversible as other forms of transfer became more dominant. Rather, we can 
easily imagine scenarios where the abandonment of sharing was an unintended 
consequence of changes at the level of social practices (of kin relations, of linguistic 
pragmatics, and of corporeal movements) that underlie sharing and make it 
possible. 
In concluding this section we may say that the difference between the various 
modes of transaction cannot be accounted for in regard to a single dimension of 
closeness or distance from house to intertribal “sectors” (Sahlins 1988: 199) 
however tempting such a reduction may be. The modes of transfer are not 
mechanically related to particular social features (such as close kinship) but they 
seem to be valued for the distinctive forms of satisfaction that they provide. After 
all, constitutive to each mode is a whole repertoire of actions that can change the 
quality of a transfer toward different ends: the pursuit of the gratification to have 
exchanged the lower valued against the higher valued (as in commodity exchange) 
or the gratification of achieving ulterior goals and particular values (as in reciprocal 
exchange) or, indeed, the gratification that an intrinsic good or value has been 
realized (as in sharing). 
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How sharing adds to an emerging theory of value 
As has been pointed out by several contributions to this special issue, part of the 
difficulty of developing an anthropological theory of value is the ambiguity of the 
term value itself. David Graeber (2001: 1–2) points out that value can be construed 
in three different ways: (1) as what makes a meaningful difference; (2) as what can 
be measured by the willingness to give something up for something else; and (3) as 
what is desirable and good. 
It is easy to see how market exchange is privileging the second of these modes 
and then pushes us to read it backward into giving and sharing as earlier and 
underdeveloped or nascent forms of value creation following the calculation of 
value in a market-type situation. What earns a high price in commercial exchange 
(2) is considered the reason why that particular item becomes desirable or more 
desirable than others (3) and it creates the most pervasive distinctions not only 
between objects but also between people (1). Graeber (2011) has summoned com-
prehensive ethnographic evidence to show why this backward and outward pro-
jection of value creation of market relations is misleading but he has also suggested 
that an emerging anthropological theory of value faces the challenge to deal with all 
three aspects of value (see Graeber 2001). 
Let us consider the three dimensions of the notion of value in regard to the 
ethnography of sharing and let us begin with the first dimension, value as 
difference, which is the main sense of value now employed in the natural sciences 
and to which anthropology, in my view, should also relate. After all, there have 
been attempts to treat transactions as values in exactly this sense, for instance in 
network analysis. In his network analysis of the southern African hxaro exchange 
system Thomas Schweizer (1997) has calculated the values of density and distri-
butedness that the exchange network has as a consequence of all exchanges added 
together as values of components within a system of transactions. In a similar 
fashion, outcome-based studies working under the evolutionary or related natural 
science paradigms investigate sharing or gift-giving in terms of the way in which 
they alter the values of available nutrition, of demographic effects, or of life 
expectancy, always in terms of individual transactions that make a difference as 
constituent elements of summative outcomes and consequences. 
Within anthropology this focus on value as meaningful difference is a minority 
position while probably being the mainstream position outside the humanities. 
Against this position the theory of reciprocal gift exchange has critically argued that 
such a treatment of transacting subjects as objects in a mathematical function does 
not do justice to the phenomena at hand because it deterministically considers 
value production in terms of its outcomes of long-term adaptation and its proper-
ties as a closed system that leaves little or no room for human agency. By contrast, 
exchange theorists insist value does not only, and not even primarily or primor-
dially, correspond to differences between measured objects and outcomes. Rather, 
it creates differences between the subjects involved in transactions that potentially 
alter these relationships. In Chris Gregory’s terms, in gift exchange the value of 
objects is kept constant while the evaluation of giver and receiver is what is altered 
in the exchange (cf. Gregory 1982). In ceremonial exchange and exchange systems 
this feature is exploited by the participants who engage in giving as a difference 
maker and as a tool for manipulating hierarchy. This can also be shown with 
regard to the !Kung hxaro exchange, which is a celebrated case in point within 
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hunter-gatherer studies. It allows !Kung embedded in a universalist kinship 
network to add difference by creating specific exchange obligations with specific 
members of their kin network. I suggest that hxaro has been a “celebrated” case 
exactly because it constitutes that part of hunter-gatherer ethnography that can be 
readily incorporated into a theory of value based on reciprocal exchange. 
However, the way it has been dealt with in anthropology is completely out of 
proportion because we need to acknowledge that it is restricted to very few 
southern African forager groups, and even among the !Kung it accounts for very 
few of the transfers that people engage with—the substantial “rest” is sharing (cf. 
Schweizer 1997; Wiessner 1998). What practices of sharing add to the difference-
making aspect of value is that it systematically decouples the various sorts of 
differences that are at stake. What I mean by that is that yes, it makes a difference 
to receive a shared item (instead of not receiving it) but sharing as a practice is set 
up as a transfer that decouples this difference from the difference between giver 
and receiver. Various pragmatic measures already mentioned (e.g., sending a child 
with a share, depreciating the share given, demanding rather than offering, initiative 
at the side of the receiver and not the giver) ensure that the transferred objects can 
make a difference to the individual while making as little difference as possible to 
the relationship between giver and receiver. In sharing it is not supposed to make a 
difference that you got this item from me rather than from someone else or 
directly from the environment. As I have tried to show above, this is by no means a 
trivial cultural achievement since it is a specific way of creating and determining 
value. The observed transfers between haves and have-nots are unlike processes of, 
say, osmosis or diffusion that may be observed outside the human lifeworld; they 
therefore require an extended theory of value that also relates to the other 
meanings of value mentioned above. 
Consequently, discussions in this special issue have focused on the other two 
notions of value (2 and 3 in Graeber’s list above) and the relation between them, 
for short the relation between (calculated, economic) value and (moral, 
sociological) values (see Graeber 2001: 1; and Otto and Willerslev, introductions 
to these two issues). The greatest challenge that sharing provides in regard to this 
discussion, I propose, is that it inverts the mainstream assumption that moral 
values are plural while economic value follows a singular standard. 
In economist thinking about transactions, value is considered to be variable to 
the extent that value is relative to the trade partners’ willingness to give up a thing 
for another. Preferences may vary but the deliberation and negotiation between 
them constitutes a single process. The process itself is usually envisaged as a 
unified process of producing a value, more specifically the value of something at a 
certain point in time. However, as we have seen in the ethnography, sharing can in 
fact be read as evidence that the frame of establishing the standard of value can be 
moved through changes in mode of transfer and thereby create plurality beyond 
diverse individual preferences. Sharing does not presuppose an explicit willingness 
to give for value to emerge. Rather we may say that sharing creates value in terms 
of the unwillingness to insist on particular possession rights in the face of social 
pressure that is based on kin ties, talk, and bodily presence. Given this social pres-
sure, potential providers at a certain point are unwilling to hang on to things or to 
measure their relative value against returns. They are willing to give up a thing not 
for another thing but for remaining on good terms with the others and for being in 
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agreement with the accepted social terms of behavior. When “sharing out” (giving 
away) they are also “sharing in” (expanding group boundaries). They are more 
willing to give up objects than to give up community with those who share. In sum, 
sharing qualifies the notion of willingness and shifts the frame of how value is 
constituted in the first place—beyond what a value theory based solely on 
measuring market exchange would suggest. This is not a simple case of converting 
the material value of items into the value of intangible “things,” such as 
community. Rather, the way of framing alters the ways in which value is created 
and not just the value of particular items that are involved. 
For instance, Frank Marlowe (2004: 86) notes what differentiates theft (or 
“tolerated theft”) from (tolerated) scrounging is the social context or situation in 
which these practices take place. Both imply that the giver does not explicitly want 
to part with what she or he has got. They differ in that theft only takes place in 
relations with another group (or another species) where outright dominance is the 
decisive and sufficient factor whereas tolerated scrounging requires practical 
circumstances that come in as extra necessary conditions. Tolerated scrounging 
takes place within the group where social pressure can be created through making 
claims on a share and through feelings of entitlement (2004: 76).4 What I have just 
labeled “extra” necessary conditions are, of course, only extra from the perspective 
of altruistic notions of sharing that dominate Western discourse. As I have pointed 
out, making demands is not at all an extra but a normal condition of sharing in 
many forager contexts and beyond.5 Conversely, providing an equal share may be 
considered normal when sharing is framed in larger processes of distribution, but 
not necessarily in the everyday practice of foragers. 
Outside observers have tended to conceptualize sharing as the allocation of an 
equal piece for everyone and they typically had to learn their lesson when they 
attempted to achieve that goal by distributing resources. My own fieldwork experi-
ence is no exception here. When completing our first long period of field 
research, my wife and I decided to slaughter a goat, to buy a sack of potatoes, and 
to invite everyone in our Hai//om settlement to come with a bowl to get “their 
share.” People were generally happy with the event but they did see problems in 
our approach to sharing, which was really distribution. To begin with, not everyone 
had a bowl and the bowls available differed considerably in size and were used by 
hearth groups of variable composition. The fact that everyone in the end did get 
included was not due to our skill of distribution but rather due to the institution-
                                                
4. Corsín Jiménez and Willerslev (2007) provide parallel cases where it is the manipu-
lation of these extra necessary conditions that lead to sharing breaking down into 
obligations of gift-giving in interethnic relations between foragers and traders (2007: 
533), into theft in interspecies relations between foragers and predatory animals (2007: 
534), or into demands for reciprocity in relations between humans and spirits 
(2007:535). 
5. It is tempting to see Marlowe’s rendering of sharing as “tolerated scrounging” in similar 
ways as Marilyn Strathern (2011) has discussed the emergence of “borrowing” as a 
mediating concept at schools in the Pacific where teachers and students with different 
backgrounds seek to find common ground for conceptualizing transfers that under the 
particular conditions at hand fit neither of the idealized forms of transfer that they bring 
to the situation. 
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alized complex sharing practices that were in place. It may help to think of this 
routine sharing practice as a system of communicating tubes (a metaphor used by 
Nurit Bird-David) that connect the sites where resources become available. As it 
was our aim to give the same amount into similar kind of bowls, we envisaged 
apportioning what was to be distributed into standardized and separate household 
units. However, there are considerable forces within a hunter-gatherer group that 
resist such standardization and although autonomy is highly valued it does not 
create impermeable units. In other words, our hosts were very tolerant in regard to 
the constitution of a hearth group that gathers around one bowl. People come 
when they are hungry and they leave when they are full. Children in particular may 
move freely between parental and grandparental homes. Partners separate and 
rejoin—even being on your own is also acceptable. Shares are usually not kept for 
those who are not present or earmarked for categories of people unless they 
engage in conversation and copresence. Through sharing people get a chance to 
connect to a system of links that act like communicating tubes. The different bowls 
(which signify diverse and fluid hearth groups) were effectively connected as if 
there were communicating tubes between them. As we put resources into one 
bowl, the level of provision rose across the whole system. Wherever and whenever 
something is added to this system the level of contents rises to roughly the same 
level irrespective of the size or shape of the bowls and irrespective of their place 
within the system. The flows eventually reach everyone—without the need for a 
single regulating body that would distribute fixed amounts, without a standard-
ization of hearth or group sizes, and without constraining the fluid boundaries of 
entities within the system. Sharing in communicating tubes works irrespective of 
whether we assume affluence or scarcity, it is not dependent on either of these two 
conditions—but as I have outlined in this contribution it depends on a number of 
other conditions that ensure that the communication channels are not blocked but 
are maintained and kept open. Thus, the process of creating economic value is 
much less unified to the extent that it may be more appropriate to speak of values, 
or value framings, in the plural because it is not only the diverse preferences of the 
agents that constitute values but more fundamentally there are differences in the 
mode of transaction that frame a particular situation. 
Thus, through its particular framing of transfers, sharing may be said to plural-
ize (economic) value creation. Moreover, sharing may also be said to singularize 
the (moral) values involved, and this is where an emerging theory of value may 
stand to gain most from an inclusion of sharing. In a market-based theory of value 
we commonly seek to establish what the goals and intentions are that make 
humans do certain things as they transfer certain objects or move to certain 
resources, for instance. We commonly do this in terms of ascribing ranked goals 
and choices between alternative goals to individual agents. Environmental factors 
are taken into account as limitations for achieving these goals—for instance, natural 
scarcity that prevents us from realizing all goals that we may have. Especially in 
anthropology we cherish the idea that the plurality of values is a natural thing in the 
sense that it is widely taken for granted in materialist (social) science that the values 
of people, and their consciousness, are a result of their economic practices and 
therefore by definition plural (see Otto and Willerslev’s introduction to part one of 
this special issue). Sharing, by contrast, seriously undermines this default 
assumption of plurality. When sharing relates to intrinsic goods and demands that 
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intrinsically and unavoidably occur when humans face one another (see Løgstrup 
1997), it posits “a world where it is necessary to aid and to give” as Emmanuel 
Levinas (1969: 216) has put it. Sharing cultivates a moral realism that constitutes a 
respected minority position in philosophy but goes against the grain of mainstream 
anthropology. Alfred Gell, who has worked in a society dominated by sharing, 
considers the emergence of exchange as an “escape route from a social order in 
which objects are transferred, and services performed, out of moral obligation, 
substituting for it one in which transfers and services can be conceptualized in 
terms of the schema of the mutually advantageous exchange of sacrifices” (Gell 
1999: 88, my emphasis). This perception of breaking away from the established 
order of things, or even negating it, has a parallel also in the activities of hunter-
gatherers who engage in gift-exchange such as hxaro to explore new routes of 
transfer.6 
Sharing invokes natural (i.e., intrinsic) limits to value plurality in a way that is 
challenging to social sciences that are adverse to given (in the sense of universal) 
environmental or indeed metaphysical foundations and limitations. If we take 
seriously the notion of sharing as realizing an intrinsic good through renouncing 
specific goals we are led to look out for affordances intrinsic to the environment in 
which humans live. The human environment affords certain goods that are shared 
goods in the sense that they are recognized as being desirable. We do not need to 
assume that there is necessarily universal agreement about what these goods are 
(although it seems very likely that there is considerable overlap crossculturally) but 
only that there is universal agreement in regard to the distinction between specific 
goals held by particular humans in particular situations and the shared goods 
afforded by the environment that humans share. In other words, what sharing adds 
to our theory of value is that it reminds us that desirability is not merely a function 
of social relations (what others want tends to become desirable to me, too) but also 
a function of inherent affordances of objects in the human environment that lend 
themselves to become desirable (what lends itself to human life becomes desirable) 
and of my ability to recognize this for myself and for fellow human beings. 
 
Conclusion 
I began this contribution with a critique of those interpretations of sharing that 
subsume sharing under other forms of transfer, transposing ideas of value derived 
from commercial market exchanges onto practices of sharing. I have then outlined 
a notion of sharing that is neither derived from commercial exchange nor from gift-
giving or other forms of reciprocity. At the same time I have argued that sharing 
does not form a neutral baseline or zero-point but that it is itself a complex 
phenomenon that is based on a combination of constituent practices to do with 
communication, relatedness, and bodily presence. I have outlined this in regard to 
the ethnography of southern African foragers but with the understanding that we 
are not dealing with a form of transfer that operates in isolation of other forms or 
                                                
6. It also has parallels in the complaints of those who live in a “tight” gift-giving regime and 
are tired of it (see Rio 2007: 452) and also of those who live in an increasingly all-
encompassing accountancy system (including present-day academics, see Otto and 
Willerslev’s introduction to this special issue). It seems that we are dealing with a more 
general phenomenon of exploring new opportunities out of existing regimes of transfer. 
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that was socially overdetermined in such a way that it was static and unchanging. 
Consequently, I argue that the demise or breakdown of sharing has to be explained 
in regard to the changes that affect its constituent practices. Finally, I have outlined 
what the ethnography of sharing has to add to an anthropological theory of value. 
According to this brief exploration, value is to be measured not only by the 
willingness to give up something for something else but also the preparedness to 
suspend measuring objects against one another in that situation and by the 
unwillingness to hang on to something in a particular situation. In regard to the 
notion of value as a difference maker, sharing suggests that what makes a 
difference to a person gaining access is not necessarily translated into a difference 
between giver and receiver if certain social strategies are in place that decouple the 
two processes of difference making. The perspective on value in terms of a desir-
able good, finally, is considerably broadened when sharing is included because it 
complements the measurement of desire in terms of competing goals with 
desirability that is based in what the environment affords to humans. 
Sharing does involve objects that are valued and desired but in contradistinction 
to gift-exchange it cannot be fully explained by a rule of reciprocity and in 
contradistinction to market exchange it cannot be fully explained in terms of values 
established through measuring objects against one another. Since demand sharing 
is its typical form, sharing is also inadequately described in terms of Western 
values of altruistic sharing. In fact, sharing events without demands are rather 
peculiar as they mark and underline the relation between giver and receiver and 
are therefore more appropriately considered as verging on gift-giving. Sharing does 
not necessarily entail that everyone gets the same; rather the value of equal 
allocation is more typically associated with situations of distribution. We may 
consider sharing to be tolerated scrounging but for the scrounging to be tolerated it 
has to build on a number of recognized modes of action and interaction. There 
are numerous pragmatic factors to do with the mode of relatedness, the modes of 
talking, and the bodily presence that influence when and what someone might 
receive as a share—or whether someone is allowed to take a share. It is therefore 
misleading to consider sharing to be any more a natural system than any other 
mode of transfer. It presupposes a cultural system similar to that of a system of 
communicating tubes wherein the flow in these communicating tubes is not 
automatic since the tubes need to be kept clear of obstacles and have to be actively 
constructed and maintained as the connections that make up the system. Both the 
construction of the system and its maintenance are complex cultural processes that 
allow us to speak of sharing as a cultural invention and innovation. The specificity 
of sharing is not that it distributes resources and transfers them from one to the 
other—sharing out—after all; this is also achieved through other forms of transfer. 
Its specificity is rather that it also constitutes sharing in, granting access to the flows 
of objects, their intrinsic goods, and their intrinsic value. 
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Partager. Accorder aux autres de prendre ce qui a de la valeur 
 
Résumé : Le partage ajoute un paradoxe à la question du transfert et de la valeur : 
pourquoi les gens partagent ce à quoi ils accordent de la valeur alors qu’ils ne 
peuvent pas compter sur un retour ? Cet article rompt avec l’hypothèse classique 
selon laquelle les pratiques de partage sont de simples stades initiaux de formes 
plus complexes d’échange de dons réciproques ou de transactions marchandes. 
J’envisage au contraire le partage comme un phénomène social complexe qui 
implique des exigences assez spécifiques en matière de coprésence corporelle, de 
rapprochement et d'interaction. Sur la base de recherches ethnographiques de 
terrain je suggère également que les formes d’« exigence de partage » ne doivent 
pas être considérées comme des aberrations car elles sont particulièrement 
conformes aux valeurs inscrites dans le partage. 
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